Theoretical analysis of the monetary policy under simultaneous demand and supply shocks
https://doi.org/10.18384/2949-5024-2025-4-6-16
Abstract
Aim. Analysis of the effectiveness of monetary policy controlling inflation under conditions of simultaneous demand and supply shocks.
Methodology. The most conventional linear representations of New Keynesian models (AD-AS and IS-LM-PC), bibliographic and qualitative methods of analysis are used.
Results. Under conditions of simultaneous demand and supply shocks, an effective monetary policy aimed at controlling inflation is achieved by a one-time, timely increase in the key rate, as well as by establishing an achievable inflation target, macro and micro prudential restrictions, tightening mandatory liquidity and capital ratios, and increasing the mandatory reserve ratio. At the same time, the key rate raise should have an upper limit and not lead to the accumulation of credit risk in the system.
Research implications. This paper contributes to the scientific literature on the analysis of monetary policy implemented by central banks. The practical significance of the paper is expressed in recommendations addressing to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation and inflation expectations.
About the Authors
V. MatyukhinRussian Federation
Valery N. Matyukhin (Moscow) – Cand. Sci. (Economics), Assoc. Prof., Financial, Economic and Business Education Department
D. Tetyuk
Russian Federation
Denis V. Tetyuk (Moscow) – Postgraduate Student, Financial, Economic and Business Education Department
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